On the Tension Between Due Process Protection and Public Safety:

The Case of an Extensive Procedural Reform in Colombia

ONLINE APPENDIX

This version: March 2026

Figure A1. Implementation of the Adversarial Procedural Reform in Colombia, 2005-2008



Note: This map shows all the municipalities in Colombia by the stage of the implementation of the adversarial procedural reform, starting with municipalities in stage 1 which implemented the reform in January of 2005 and ending with municipalities in stage 4 which implemented it in January of 2008.

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics Variables in Main Results

Variables	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev	Min	Max
Unweighted Crime	78,894	14.99	23.58	0	834.33
Crime Index	78,894	2.57	4.19	0	134.42
Violent Crime Index	78,894	4.11	8.34	0	307.25
Property Crime Index	78,894	1.37	3.03	0	93.73
Homicides	78,894	3.76	9.76	0	374.90
Assaults	78,894	5.29	12.57	0	834.33
Sexual Offenses	62,977	4.49	8.44	0	232.29
Drug Offenses	62,977	3.51	9.77	0	941.37
Muggings	78,894	2.92	8.16	0	286.81
Business Robberies	78,894	0.96	3.51	0	99.50
Vehicle Thefts	78,894	0.43	2.30	0	183.53
Home Burglaries	78,894	1.63	5.68	0	191.94
Arrests	78,894	1.52	1.53	0	6.77
% Rural Population	78,894	1.05	0.65	0	4.09
Education Investment	77,660	3.55	0.94	0	12.34
Industry Tax Revenue	78,810	0.01	0.03	0	0.52
Fiscal Performance	77,790	4.08	0.16	2.52	4.51
Population Density	78,894	3.85	1.23	0.14	9.58
Forced Displacement Expulsion	78,918	3.83	2.11	0	9.63
Forced Displacement Reception	78,918	3.07	2.24	0	10.61

Note: this table shows the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for our variables of interests, both result and control. Crimes and arrests are reported per 100,000 Inhabitants.

Data Construction

Aggregated Crime

We created aggregated weighted crime as in Ortega, Mejía, and Ortiz (2015), following:

$$C_{i,t} = \sum_{s \in C} \left(\frac{p_s}{\sum_{s' \in C} p_{s'}} * S_{i,t} \right) \quad (1A)$$

where $C_{i,t}$ represents one of the three crime indices (total, violent, or property) in municipality i and month t; $S_{i,t}$ is the crimecrate for type of crime s, in municipality i, during month t, expressed in terms of incidences per 100,000 inhabitants, and p_s is the average sentence length in years for individuals convicted for crime s. We calculated average sentence length using the Penal Code of 2007. To calculate the maximum sentence length, we used the maximum prison sentence for each crime corrected by the maximum prison sentence in case of an aggravating circumstance. Table A2 reports these weights (p_s).

Table A2. Minimum and Maximum Sentence Length Colombian Penal Code

Crime	Min	Max	Average(p_s)
Homicides	13	40	27
Assaults	1	15	8
Muggings	1	16	9
Business Robberies	2	28	15
Home Burglaries	6	14	10
Vehicle Thefts	7	15	11
Total	30	128	80

Note: this table shows the minimum and maximum sentence length for different types of crimes according to the Colombian Penal Code 2007, Articles 103, 111-116, 239-241. These lengths are used to build the weights for the crime indices.

Indicators of Judicial and Prosecutorial Activity

First, we constructed rates allowing for information delays and timespans between denominator and numerator (CEPEJ 2014; Marciano et al. 2019):

$$Clearance\ Rate_{i,t}^{s} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{-11} Imputations_{i,t}^{s}}{\sum_{t=-1}^{11} Crime\ Reports_{i,t}^{s}} \quad (2A)$$

$$Settlement\ Rate_{i,t}^{s} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{-11} Settlements_{i,t}^{s}}{\sum_{t=-1}^{11} Crime\ Reports_{i,t}^{s}} \quad (3A)$$

$$Acquittals\ or\ Convictions\ Rate_{i,t}^{s} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{-11} Acquittals\ or\ Convictions_{i,t}^{s}}{\sum_{t=-1}^{11} Crime\ Reports_{i,t}^{s}} \quad (4A)$$

In the second group, we proposed rates controlling for the total number of cases when no logical time-gap between denominator and numerator exists:

$$Preventive\ Measures_{i,t}^{s} = \frac{Cases\ with\ Active\ Measures_{i,t}^{s}}{Cases\ with\ Imputations_{i,t}^{s}} \quad (5A)$$

$$Acquittals\ or\ Convictions\ Ratio_{i,t}^{s} = \frac{Acquittals\ or\ Convictions\ in\ Court_{i,t}^{s}}{Acquittals + Convictions\ in\ Court_{i,t}^{s}} \quad (6A)$$

Figure A2. Evolution of the Average Number of Crimes by Stage of Implementation



Note: these figures show the average value of the four aggregate crime measures by stages of implementation of the adversarial procedural reform in Colombia, using a three-month moving average (MA-3) and normalizing the value in the month before implementation (represented by the grey vertical band) to 1. These crime indices are computed as weighted averages of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A.

Figure A3. Evolution of the Average Number of Crimes in Colombia's Largest Cities



Note: these figures show the average values of the four aggregate crime measures across Colombia's five largest cities: Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla, and Cartagena. The number in parentheses denotes the stage of implementation to which the municipality belongs. These series were plotted after taking a three-month moving average (MA-3) and normalizing the value in the month before implementation to 1 (represented by the grey vertical band). These crime indices are computed as the weighted average of different types of crimes, where the weights are given by the average sentence length of each type of crime and are presented in Table 2A

Data Comparability Across Sources

We use prosecutorial administrative data on judicial decisions and judicial outcomes from the inquisitorial model information system (SIJUF) and the adversarial model information system (SPOA). Because our empirical strategy combines prosecutorial outcomes across the staggered implementation of the reform, it is important to clarify that the estimated effects are unlikely to be driven by mechanical discontinuities in coding, classification, or timestamp recording across SIJUF and SPOA.

Offense classifications are identical across SIJUF and SPOA. The procedural reform did not modify substantive criminal law, and crimes continue to be defined under the same articles of the Colombian Penal Code. Offense identifiers in both systems correspond to the same statutory provisions. Consequently, offense-level aggregation is mechanically comparable across systems, and no translation or recategorization of crime types is required.

To ensure comparability, the General Prosecutor's Office standardized outcome categories across SIJUF and SPOA. Person-level records are harmonized using a unified label ("indiciado") across systems. Disposition categories, including indictment, acquittal, conviction, dismissal, and settlement, are recorded under identical outcome labels in the harmonized data. The alignment of these categories reflects administrative standardization performed by the Prosecutor's Office rather than researcher-driven recoding.

Timestamp variables are recorded consistently across systems. Dates associated with case initiation, procedural actions, and case dispositions are stored under the same format in both systems. Duration measures are derived from standardized timestamp fields. There is no change in temporal granularity or recording conventions coinciding with the procedural transition.

To further assess comparability, we obtained prosecutorial data in three independent formats: (i) case-level records, (ii) judicial action-level records (actuaciones judiciales), and (iii) person-level records (imputado/indiciado). These datasets differ in unit of observation but contain overlapping information. Aggregated totals by municipality and month match closely across these extractions, and variable names, offense coding, and procedural categories are aligned across SIJUF and SPOA within each format, reducing the likelihood that observed patterns are driven by system architecture or file structure.

The crime outcomes analyzed in the paper are drawn from police administrative records, which are institutionally independent of prosecutorial information systems. These crime measures are not constructed using SIJUF or SPOA data.

Finally, we validate the pretrial detention measures using independent prison administrative records. Pretrial detention in prosecutorial data corresponds to individuals remanded to detention

facilities prior to conviction. We replicate the analysis using prison admissions and stock measures of pretrial detainees and obtain patterns consistent with those reported using prosecutorial data (see Table 2). Because prison administrative records are institutionally separate from prosecutorial information systems, the alignment of results across these independent sources provides additional evidence that observed changes in pretrial detention reflect real institutional changes rather than recording artifacts associated with the transition between SIJUF and SPOA.

Taken together, the identical substantive offense coding, the administrative harmonization of procedural categories, the uniform timestamp structure, the consistency across independent prosecutorial data extractions, and the corroboration of detention patterns using independent prison records mitigate concerns that the estimated effects reflect mechanical differences between information systems rather than changes associated with the procedural reform.

Parallel Trends

Besides the main results we obtain from equation (1), we use this model to estimate statistical differences during the pre-treatment period for variables contained in vector $X_{i,t}$ and the lag of arrests ($Z_{i,t-1}$). For variables in vector $X_{i,t}$, we use the yearly-municipality information provided by the CEDE between 2000-2004 and restrict the analysis to the pre-treatment period. Figure A4 illustrates that our treatment and control groups had parallel trends in all variables during the five years before the implementation of the reform, except for population density.

In addition to the unconditional evaluation of the parallel trends and phase-in effects, we estimate a version of equation (1) that includes a vector $X_{i,t}$ containing the aforementioned economic, demographic, and institutional variables to control for time-varying municipality characteristics. Additionally, we incorporate the lag of police arrests to avoid endogeneity with this variable (Listokin 2003; Pfaff 2008; Rosenfeld and Wallman 2019). We perform this estimation and confirm that the parallel trends assumption seems to be reasonable even after the inclusion of the variables in $X_{i,t}$. Table A3 presents these results, confirming those presented in Figures 6 to 8 from the main text.

Figure A4. Leads-and-Lags Pre-Treatment Evaluation for Control Variables



Note: these figures show the coefficients of different regressions between each one of the control variables on time dummies for each period before the implementation of the procedural reform in Colombia. Except for arrests, which are available monthly, all variables are on a year-municipality level.

Table A3. Conditional Event Study Results During the Pre-Treatment Period

Months Before Implementation	(1) Unweighted Crime	(2) Crime Index	(3) Violent Crime	(4) Property Crime	(5) Homicides	(6) Assaults	(7) Sexual Offenses	(8) Drug Offenses	(9) Muggings	(10) Business Robberies	(11) Vehicles Thefts	(12) Home Burglaries
12 Months	0.269	0.167	0.503	-0.094	0.616	0.124	0.490	0.132	-0.426	-0.009	0.074	-0.108
	(1.849)	(0.260)	(0.462)	(0.216)	(0.457)	(1.085)	(0.693)	(0.939)	(0.537)	(0.255)	(0.097)	(0.331)
11 Months	1.772	0.265	0.652	-0.037	0.432	1.395	0.698	1.051	-0.014	-0.253	0.151	0.060
	(1.753)	(0.262)	(0.466)	(0.209)	(0.487)	(0.933)	(0.466)	(0.781)	(0.523)	(0.187)	(0.104)	(0.336)
10 Months	1.359	0.081	-0.041	0.176	-0.244	0.644	0.095	0.767	0.699	-0.184	-0.051	0.495
	(1.785)	(0.239)	(0.362)	(0.225)	(0.348)	(0.913)	(0.536)	(0.880)	(0.547)	(0.227)	(0.083)	(0.364)
9 Months	1.596	0.283	0.587	0.047	0.511	0.841	0.638	-0.325	-0.036	-0.052	-0.124	0.456
	(1.619)	(0.238)	(0.402)	(0.192)	(0.460)	(0.830)	(0.453)	(1.109)	(0.465)	(0.182)	(0.095)	(0.317)
8 Months	3.120	0.451	0.757*	0.212	0.511	1.586	0.883	0.190	0.564	-0.028	0.026	0.460
	(2.069)	(0.282)	(0.422)	(0.280)	(0.429)	(0.984)	(0.573)	(0.740)	(0.591)	(0.200)	(0.103)	(0.565)
7 Months	2.234	0.288	0.394	0.206	0.214	1.002	0.501	0.770	0.754	-0.039	0.046	0.257
	(1.913)	(0.254)	(0.391)	(0.223)	(0.344)	(1.044)	(0.538)	(0.862)	(0.657)	(0.188)	(0.077)	(0.333)
6 Months	1.248	0.210	0.430	0.039	0.373	0.624	0.306	-0.043	0.212	-0.132	0.140*	0.029
	(1.592)	(0.221)	(0.373)	(0.183)	(0.368)	(0.892)	(0.498)	(0.896)	(0.488)	(0.174)	(0.082)	(0.353)
5 Months	1.357	0.057	-0.095	0.174	-0.430	1.038	0.248	-0.055	0.068	0.057	0.132*	0.491
	(2.180)	(0.287)	(0.375)	(0.300)	(0.378)	(1.074)	(0.549)	(0.932)	(0.458)	(0.303)	(0.070)	(0.718)
4 Months	2.271	0.220	0.183	0.249	-0.173	1.385	0.485	0.103	0.478	0.219	-0.004	0.365
	(2.142)	(0.286)	(0.379)	(0.295)	(0.363)	(0.968)	(0.518)	(0.954)	(0.559)	(0.303)	(0.070)	(0.595)
3 Months	2.385	0.407	0.889*	0.032	0.701	1.526*	0.371	-0.207	0.003	-0.031	0.016	0.171
	(2.025)	(0.319)	(0.519)	(0.272)	(0.627)	(0.896)	(0.514)	(0.901)	(0.552)	(0.289)	(0.076)	(0.452)
2 Months	0.319	0.068	0.129	0.022	0.139	0.092	1.017**	0.163	0.060	0.027	0.015	-0.015
	(1.808)	(0.252)	(0.369)	(0.211)	(0.362)	(0.880)	(0.482)	(0.865)	(0.534)	(0.243)	(0.093)	(0.343)
Observations	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	62,975	62,975	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894
R-squared	0.292	0.210	0.146	0.346	0.137	0.159	0.129	0.299	0.299	0.141	0.102	0.191
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipality FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on interactions between an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in a given municipality and month, and dummy variables of each month before the implementation of the procedural reform. All regressions control for municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects, as well as for per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, population density, rural index, displaced population, and the lagged police arrest rate. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Crime indices are computed as weighted averages of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robustness, Placebo Tests and Alternative Specifications

To test the robustness of our results, we present the results of the main specification from equation (2), excluding the lags of arrests. Results are robust to the exclusion of this variable.

In a second falsification test, we randomly assign all Colombian municipalities to different waves and estimate equation (1) using this random order. We repeat this random assignment 100 times and, in Table A5, present the average coefficients and standard errors across these 100 estimations. After these 100-estimations, we do not find a consistent pattern indicating spurious results.

Tables A6 to A8 show that our results are robust to excluding Bogota, Medellin and Cali, Colombia's three largest cities and where most crime is located. In addition, Tables A9 to A11 show that the results also hold when excluding the vector of control variables $X_{i,t}$ and the lag of arrests.

Moreover, we include different empirical exercises to test the robustness of our results, recognizing the staggered nature of our treatment. First, Figure A5 presents a graphic representation of the Goodman-Bacon (2021) decomposition for the different outcomes of interest. These decompositions reveal the substantial variance in optimal weights across comparison groups and motivate the use of alternative estimation methods.

Second, we estimate the event-study specifications using the doubly robust estimator proposed by Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021), which weights these comparisons by both the variance and the centrality of the treatment. In these estimations, we cluster the standard errors at the judicial district times month of the year level (figures A6 to A9). Figures A10 to A22 show results similar to those in the text, but with slightly larger standard errors and a wider time window.

Then, we estimate our differences-in-differences specification using the methodology proposed by Wooldridge (2025), who states that a highly flexible Difference-in-Difference model can account for this issue and produce similar estimates than those from the above-mentioned authors, but with lower standard errors. Table A12 contains the results. In Tables A13 to A15, we estimate our difference-in-differences specifications assuming that the data follow a Poisson distribution. This assumption allows us to verify how the main results change when accounting for the large proportion of zeros in some variables. The main results remain robust to changes in the distributional assumption. Finally, Tables A16 to A18 present the main results, but with clustering at the judicial district × year × month level. The results and significance remain robust to this clustering.

Table A4. Robustness Check without the lag of arrests

	(1) Unweighted Crime	(2) Crime Index	(3) Violent Crime	(4) Property Crime	(5) Homicides	(6) Assaults	(7) Sexual Offenses	(8) Drug Offenses	(9) Muggings	(10) Business Robberies	(11) Vehicles Thefts	(12) Home Burglaries
Panel A:												
T	-2.372***	-0.459***	-0.993***	-0.044	-0.903***	-1.297***	0.123	-0.109	0.113	0.007	-0.182***	-0.110
	(0.641)	(0.125)	(0.269)	(0.058)	(0.293)	(0.409)	(0.229)	(0.159)	(0.152)	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.110)
Observations	25,689	25,689	25,689	25,689	25,689	25,689	19,146	19,146	25,689	25,689	25,689	25,689
R-square	0.414	0.286	0.232	0.494	0.220	0.307	0.207	0.414	0.399	0.212	0.163	0.301
Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in a given municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (only in panel B). All regressions control for municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects, as well as per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, population density, rural index, displaced population, and exclude the lagged police arrest. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Crime indices are computed as weighted averages of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A5. Randomization Falsification Test-Average Calculations 100-Estimations

	(1) Crime Index	(2) Violent Crime	(3) Property Crime	(4) Homicides	(5) Assaults	(6) Muggings	(7) Business Robberies	(8) Vehicles Thefts	(9) Home Burglaries
Panel A:									
Placebo	0.005	0.007	0.004	0.005	0.015	0.016	-0.001	-0.001	0.004
	(0.039)	(0.079)	(0.029)	(0.091)	(0.129)	(0.079)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.062)
Observations	75976	75976	75976	75976	75976	75976	75976	75976	75976
R-square	0.215	0.150	0.346	0.141	0.168	0.302	0.135	0.108	0.187
Panel B:									
Placebo	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Exposure Placebo	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Observations	78894	78894	78894	78894	78894	78894	78894	78894	78894
R-square	0.327	0.272	0.400	0.267	0.267	0.379	0.292	0.234	0.293
Year Month & Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipio FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: this table shows a falsification test of the paper's main result, where we randomly assigned all Colombian municipalities to different waves of implementation and estimate 100 times a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the placebo reform has been implemented in a given municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of the placebo implementation up to 12 months (panel B). The table presents the average estimator and standard errors across these 100 estimations. All regressions control for municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects, as well as for per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, population density, rural index, displaced population, and the lagged police arrest rate. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Crime indices are computed as weighted averages of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A6. Difference-in-Difference Results for Aggregate Crime Measures (excluding Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali)

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Unweighted Crime	(2) Crime Index	(3) Violent Crime Index	(4) Property Crime Index	(5) Unweighted Crime	(6) Crime Index	(7) Violent Crime Index	(8) Property Crime Index
T	4.025***	0.455***	0.622***	0.325***	3.535***	0.405***	0.615***	0.241***
	(0.603)	(0.078)	(0.126)	(0.080)	(0.604)	(0.079)	(0.126)	(0.081)
Exposure Time to T					0.202***	0.021***	0.003	0.035***
					(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Observations	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763
R-squared	0.299	0.214	0.151	0.342	0.300	0.215	0.151	0.345
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	13.497	2.443	4.103	1.152	13.497	2.443	4.103	1.152
Effect of Reform	30%	19%	15%	28%	44%	27%	16%	57%

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). Regressions exclude Colombia's largest cities: Bogota, Medellin, and Cali. All regressions control for municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects, as well as for per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, population density, rural index, displaced population, and the lagged police arrest rate. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). Crime indices are computed as weighted averages of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A7. Difference-in-Difference Results for Violent and Drug Crimes (excluding Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali)

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Homicides	Assaults	Sexual Offenses	Drug Offenses	Homicides	Assaults	Sexual Offenses	Drug Offenses
T	0.041	2.585***	-0.077	-2.722***	0.074	2.439***	-0.109	-3.111***
	(0.121)	(0.327)	(0.160)	(0.247)	(0.118)	(0.325)	(0.160)	(0.275)
Exposure Time to T					-0.014*	0.060***	0.017**	0.211***
					(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.031)
Observations	75,763	75,763	60,669	60,669	75,763	75,763	60,669	60,669
R-squared	0.141	0.170	0.128	0.297	0.141	0.170	0.128	0.304
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	3.981	4.517	4.125	2.907	3.981	4.517	4.125	2.907
Effect of Reform	1%	57%	-2%	-94%	-2%	70%	2%	-20%

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in a given municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). Regressions exclude Colombia's largest cities: Bogota, Medellin, and Cali. All regressions control for municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects, as well as for per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, population density, rural index, displaced population, and the lagged police arrest rate. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A8. Difference-in-Difference Results for Property Crimes (excluding Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali)

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Muggings	(2) Business Robberies	(3) Vehicles Thefts	(4) Home Burglaries	(5) Muggings	(6) Business Robberies	(7) Vehicles Thefts	(8) Home Burglaries
T	0.711***	0.257***	0.069**	0.363***	0.450*	0.200**	0.076**	0.295**
	(0.232)	(0.081)	(0.034)	(0.131)	(0.238)	(0.082)	(0.035)	(0.130)
Exposure Time to T					0.108***	0.023***	-0.003	0.028***
					(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Observations	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763	75,763
R-squared	0.301	0.134	0.091	0.186	0.304	0.134	0.091	0.187
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	2.413	0.771	0.425	1.390	2.413	0.771	0.425	1.390
Effect of Reform	29%	33%	16%	26%	72%	62%	9%	45%

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in a given municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). Regressions exclude Colombia's largest cities: Bogota, Medellin, and Cali. All regressions control for municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects, as well as for per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, population density, rural index, displaced population, and the lagged police arrest rate. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A9. Difference-in-Difference Results for Aggregated Measures – No Controls

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Unweighted Crime	(2) Crime Index	(3) Violent Crime Index	(4) Property Crime Index	(5) Unweighted Crime	(6) Crime Index	(7) Violent Crime Index	(8) Property Crime Index
T	3.605***	0.412***	0.604***	0.263***	3.139***	0.366***	0.607***	0.179**
	(0.602)	(0.078)	(0.125)	(0.082)	(0.599)	(0.079)	(0.126)	(0.083)
Exposure Time to T					0.176***	0.018***	-0.001	0.032***
					(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Observations	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894
R-squared	0.292	0.210	0.146	0.345	0.293	0.210	0.146	0.347
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	13.529	2.448	4.106	1.159	13.529	2.448	4.106	1.159
Effect of Reform	27%	17%	15%	23%	39%	24%	14%	49%

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in a given municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). Crime indices are computed as weighted averages of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A10. Difference-in-Difference Results for Violent and Drug Crimes – No Controls

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Homicides	Assaults	Sexual Offenses	Drug Offenses	Homicides	Assaults	Sexual Offenses	Drug Offenses
T	0.059	2.445***	-0.102	-2.673***	0.100	2.314***	-0.134	-3.108***
	(0.119)	(0.325)	(0.161)	(0.229)	(0.117)	(0.323)	(0.161)	(0.266)
Exposure Time to T					-0.016*	0.050***	0.015*	0.207***
					(0.008)	(0.018)	(0.008)	(0.030)
Observations	78,894	78,894	62,977	62,977	78,894	78,894	62,977	62,977
R-squared	0.137	0.158	0.128	0.296	0.137	0.159	0.128	0.304
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	3.983	4.519	4.129	2.936	3.983	4.519	4.129	2.936
Effect of Reform	1%	54%	-2%	-91%	-2%	64%	1%	-21%

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A11. Difference-in-Difference Results for Property Crimes – No Controls

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Muggings	(2) Business Robberies	(3) Vehicles Thefts	(4) Home Burglaries	(5) Muggings	(6) Business Robberies	(7) Vehicles Thefts	(8) Home Burglaries
T	0.502**	0.253***	0.067**	0.279**	0.239	0.193**	0.077**	0.215*
	(0.235)	(0.083)	(0.034)	(0.131)	(0.238)	(0.083)	(0.034)	(0.128)
Exposure Time to T					0.100***	0.022***	-0.004*	0.024***
					(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Observations	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894	78,894
R-squared	0.299	0.141	0.101	0.190	0.301	0.142	0.101	0.191
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	2.421	0.775	0.439	1.392	2.421	0.775	0.439	1.392
Effect of Reform	21%	33%	15%	20%	59%	59%	7%	36%

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A5. Goodman-Bacon (2021) Decomposition



Figure A5. Goodman-Bacon (2021) Decomposition (continuation)



Note: these figures show the result of the Goodman-Bacon (2020) decomposition for different types of crimes. Crime indices are computed as the weighted average of different types of crimes, where the weights are given by the average sentence length of each type of crime and are presented in Table 2A. The horizontal axis shows the weight assign by the decomposition, while the vertical axis shows the estimate given by the comparison of a particular pair of treatment-control groups.

Figure A6. Event Study Estimation using Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021) Methodology: Aggregated Crime Measures



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of different crime rates as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, estimated using Callaway & Sant'Anna's (2021) doubly robust estimator. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals computed with standard errors clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Crime indices are computed as the weighted average of different types of crime, with weights determined by the average sentence length for each type.

Figure A7. Event Study Estimation using Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021) Methodology: Violent Crimes



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of different crime rates as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, estimated using Callaway & Sant'Anna's (2021) doubly robust estimator. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals computed with standard errors clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level.

Figure A8. Event Study Estimation using Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021) Methodology: Property Crimes



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of different crime rates as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, estimated using Callaway & Sant'Anna's (2021) doubly robust estimator. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals computed with standard errors clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level.

Figure A9. Event Study Estimation using Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021) Methodology: Arrests



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of different crime rates as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, estimated using Callaway & Sant'Anna's (2021) doubly robust estimator. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals computed with standard errors clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level.

Table A12. Difference-in-Difference Results using Wooldridge's (2021) Methodology

Panel A: Crime Aggregations	(1) Unweighted Crime	(2) Crime Index	(3) Violent Crime Index	(4) Property Crime Index
T	3.602***	0.352***	0.443***	0.281***
	(0.637)	(0.091)	(0.156)	(0.075)
Observations	75,975	75,975	75,975	75,975
R-squared	0.323	0.231	0.163	0.376
Panel B: Violent Crimes	(1) Homicides	(2) Assaults	(3) Sexual Offenses	(4) Drug Offenses
T	-0.179	2.540***	-0.060	-1.903***
	(0.152)	(0.348)	(0.188)	(0.201)
Observations	75,975	75,975	60,881	60,881
R-squared	0.151	0.196	0.137	0.329
Panel C: Property Crimes	(1) Muggings	(2) Business Robberies	(3) Vehicles Thefts	(4) Home Burglaries
T	0.601***	0.161*	0.047	0.432***
	(0.206)	(0.089)	(0.033)	(0.136)
Observations	75,975	75,975	75,975	75,975
R-squared	0.339	0.153	0.122	0.215
Year Month & Month-Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Municipality FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Note: this table shows the results of a two-way fixed effects regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month, estimated using the methodology presented in Wooldridge (2021). All regressions control for municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects, as well as for per capita Industry and Business tax collection, per capita investment in education, fiscal performance, population density, rural index, displaced population, and the lagged police arrest rate. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Crime indices from Panel A are computed as weighted averages of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A.

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure A10. Leads-and-lags model: Procedural Times – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the number of days between different stages of the criminal process, as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level.

Figure A11. Leads-and-lags model: Pretrial detention in jail – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of the rates of pre-trial detentions in jail for different crimes as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Pretrial detention rates are computed as the ratio of the number of cases with active measures in a municipality-month to the total number of cases with imputations in that same municipality-month.

Figure A12. Leads-and-lags model: Pretrial house arrest – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of the rates of pre-trial house arrests for different crimes as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Pretrial detention rates are computed as the ratio of the number of cases with active measures in a municipality-month to the total number of cases with imputations in that same municipality-month.

Figure A13. Leads-and-lags model: Pretrial detention total – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of the rates of total pre-trial detentions for different crimes as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Pretrial detention rates are computed as the ratio of the number of cases with active measures in a municipality-month to the total number of cases with imputations in that same municipality-month.

Figure A14. Leads-and-lags model for Settlement rate – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of settlement rates for the two minor crimes in our data for which a settlement hearing before the imputation of charges hearing is mandatory under the new system (property crimes and assault) as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Settlement rates are computed as the ratio between settlements and open cases for a specific crime in a municipality allowing for information delays and timespans, i.e., $Settlement\ Rate_{i,t}^{s} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{-11} Settlements_{i,t}^{s}}{\sum_{t=-1}^{11} Open\ Cases_{i,t}^{s}}$.

Figure A15. Leads-and-lags model for Acquittal rates – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of acquittal rates for different crimes as a function of leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Rates are computed as the ratio between the total number of acquittals and open cases for a specific crime in a municipality allowing for information delays and timespans, i.e., $Acquittals\ Rate^{s}_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{-11} Acquittals^{s}_{i,t}}{\sum_{t=-1}^{11} Open\ Cases^{s}_{i,t}}$.

Figure A16. Leads-and-lags model for conviction rates – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of conviction rates for different crimes as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Rates are computed as the ratio between the total number of convictions and open cases for a specific crime in a municipality allowing for information delays and timespans, i.e., $Convictions\ Rate_{i,t}^{s} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{-11} Convictions_{i,t}^{s}}{\sum_{t=-1}^{11} Open\ Cases_{i,t}^{s}}$.

Figure A17. Leads-and-lags model for the share of acquittals in trial over total sentences in trial – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of in-trial acquittals for different crimes as a function of leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Rates are computed as the ratio between the number of in-trial acquittals and open cases for a specific crime in a municipality allowing for information delays and timespans, i.e., $Acquittals\ Rate^{s}_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{-11} Acquittals^{s}_{i,t}}{\sum_{t=-1}^{11} Open\ Cases^{s}_{i,t}}$.

Figure A18. Leads-and-lags model for the share of convictions in trial over total sentences in trial – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of in-trial convictions for different crimes as a function of leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Rates are computed as the ratio between the number of in-trial convictions and open cases for a specific crime in a municipality allowing for information delays and timespans, i.e., $Convictions\ Rate^{s}_{i,t} = \frac{\sum_{t=0}^{-11} Convictions^{s}_{i,t}}{\sum_{t=-1}^{11} Open\ Cases^{s}_{i,t}}$.

Figure A19. Leads-and-lags model for arrest rates – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of the arrest rate per 100,000 inhabitants as a function of the leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level.

Figure A20. Leads-and-lags model for Aggregate Crime Indices – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of crime rates as a function of leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Crime indices are computed as the weighted average of different types of crime, with weights determined by the average sentence length for each type.

Figure A21. Leads-and-lags model for Violent and Drug-related crimes – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of crime rates as a function of leads and lags relative to the month of reform implementation in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level.

Figure A22. Leads-and-lags model for Property crimes – Longer Run



Note: this figure shows the results of an event study of the logarithm of crime rates as a function of leads and lags relative to the month of implementation of the reform in a municipality, over a 60-month time window. Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level.

Table A13. Difference-in-Difference Results for Aggregate Crime Measures Assuming Poisson Distribution

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Unweighted Crime	(2) Crime Index	(3) Violent Crime Index	(4) Property Crime Index	(5) Unweighted Crime	(6) Crime Index	(7) Violent Crime Index	(8) Property Crime Index
T	0.197***	0.167***	0.167***	0.137**	0.185**	0.150**	0.154***	0.137
	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.055)	(0.094)	(0.071)	(0.057)	(0.151)
Exposure Time to T					0.013***	0.010***	0.006*	0.018**
					(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Observations	76,974	76,974	76,974	75,392	76,974	76,974	76,974	75,392
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	13.497	2.443	4.103	1.152	13.497	2.443	4.103	1.152
Effect of Reform	1%	7%	4%	12%	3%	11%	6%	31%

Note: this table shows the results of a regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). For this approach, we assume a Poisson data distribution. All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). Crime indices are computed as the weighted average of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A14. Difference-in-Difference Results for Violent and Drug Crimes Assuming Poisson Distribution

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Homicides	(2) Assaults	(3) Sexual Offenses	(4) Drug Offenses	(5) Homicides	(6) Assaults	(7) Sexual Offenses	(8) Drug Offenses
T	0.069***	0.148***	-0.190***	-0.968***	0.069	0.142	-0.189***	-1.033***
	(0.020)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.056)	(0.043)	(0.095)	(0.051)	(0.127)
Exposure Time to T					0.000	0.006	-0.001	0.032***
					(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.005)
Observations	75,186	76,711	61,508	54,411	75,186	76,711	61,508	54,411
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	3.9806	4.5174	4.12477	2.907465	3.9806	4.517	4.12477	2.907465
Effect of Reform	0.02	0.03	-0.05	-0.33	0.02	0.05	-0.05	-0.22

Note: this table shows the results of a regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). For this approach, we assume a Poisson data distribution. All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A15. Difference-in-Difference Results for Property Crimes Assuming Poisson Distribution

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Muggings	(2) Business Robberies	(3) Vehicles Thefts	(4) Home Burglaries	(5) Muggings	(6) Business Robberies	(7) Vehicles Thefts	(8) Home Burglaries
T	0.321***	0.337***	0.268***	0.186***	0.325***	0.340***	0.270**	0.187*
	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.084)	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.109)
Exposure Time to T					0.004	0.008*	-0.002	0.005
					(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
R-squared	72,544	64,852	50,376	68,716	72,544	64,852	50,376	68,716
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	2.413	0.771	0.425	1.390	2.413	0.771	0.425	1.390
Effect of Reform	13%	44%	63%	13%	15%	57%	58%	18%

Note: this table shows the results of a regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). For this approach, we assume a Poisson data distribution. All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A16. Difference-in-Difference Results for Aggregate Crime Measures (Standard Errors Clustered at the Judicial District - Year - Month Level

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Unweighted Crime	(2) Crime Index	(3) Violent Crime Index	(4) Property Crime Index	(5) Unweighted Crime	(6) Crime Index	(7) Violent Crime Index	(8) Property Crime Index
T	4.053***	0.459***	0.622***	0.333***	3.558***	0.407***	0.611***	0.249***
	(0.594)	(0.081)	(0.127)	(0.081)	(0.602)	(0.079)	(0.126)	(0.081)
Exposure Time to T					0.205***	0.022***	0.005	0.035***
					(0.031)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.004)
Observations	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	13.529	2.448	4.106	1.1591	13.529	2.448	4.106	1.1591
Effect of Reform	30%	19%	15%	29%	44%	27%	16%	58%

Note: this table shows the results of a regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times year times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). Crime indices are computed as weighted averages of different types of crime, with weights given by the average sentence length for each type and presented in Table 2A. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A17. Difference-in-Difference Results for Violent and Drug Crimes (Standard Errors Clustered at the Judicial District - Year - Month Level)

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Homicides	Assaults	Sexual Offenses	Drug Offenses	Homicides	Assaults	Sexual Offenses	Drug Offenses
T	0.042	2.578***	-0.088	-2.758***	0.071	2.432***	-0.118	-3.142***
	(0.130)	(0.297)	(0.164)	(0.248)	(0.118)	(0.323)	(0.159)	(0.273)
Exposure Time to T					-0.012	0.061***	0.016*	0.209***
					(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.009)	(0.031)
Observations	75,976	75,976	60,882	60,882	75,976	75,976	60,882	60,882
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	3.983	4.519	4.129	2.936	3.983	4.519	4.123	2.936
Effect of Reform	1%	57%	-2%	-94%	-2%	70%	2%	-22%

Note: this table shows the results of a regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times year times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\,T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\,T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A18. Difference-in-Difference Results for Property Crimes (Standard Errors Clustered at the Judicial District - Year - Month Level)

VARIABLES	Panel A				Panel B			
	(1) Muggings	(2) Business Robberies	(3) Vehicles Thefts	(4) Home Burglaries	(5) Muggings	(6) Business Robberies	(7) Vehicles Thefts	(8) Home Burglaries
T	0.733***	0.264***	0.064*	0.371***	0.471**	0.208**	0.072**	0.303**
	(0.205)	(0.079)	(0.035)	(0.140)	(0.237)	(0.082)	(0.035)	(0.129)
Exposure Time to T					0.109***	0.023***	-0.003*	0.028***
					(0.012)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Observations	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976	75,976
Year Month & Month-Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Municipio FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Mean T=0	2.421	0.775	0.439	1.392	2.421	0.775	0.439	1.392
Effect of Reform	30%	34%	15%	27%	73%	62%	8%	46%

Note: this table shows the results of a regression of different crime rates on an indicator variable that equals 1 if the adversarial procedural reform has been implemented in each municipality and month (all columns) and the non-negative difference between a given month and the month of implementation up to 12 months (columns 5 to 8). All regressions control for only municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district times year times month of the year level. Mean T=0 corresponds to the mean of the dependent variable for those observations in the control group before the implementation of the reform. Effect of T is calculated as $\frac{\beta_1}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (1) to (4) and as $\frac{\beta_1 + (\beta_2 * 12)}{Mean\ T=0} * 100$ for columns (5) to (8). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table A19. Joint Test of Pre-Reform Trends

Outcome	F-statistic	p-value
Arrests	0.90	0.479
Unweighted Crime	0.46	0.931
Crime Index	0.48	0.910
Violent Crime Index	0.98	0.467
Property Crime Index	0.32	0.996

Note: this table reports joint F-tests of the null hypothesis that all coefficients on the leads of the reform indicator in the event-study specification are jointly equal to zero. The test, therefore, evaluates whether outcomes exhibit systematic pre-treatment trends prior to the implementation of the adversarial procedural reform. Failure to reject the null hypothesis supports the parallel trends assumption underlying the difference-in-differences design. All regressions include municipality, year, month, and year*month fixed effects, as well as the same control variables used in the baseline specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the judicial district and month-of-year level.

Figure A23. Pre-Reform vs. Post-Reform Criminal Process (Law 600/00 vs. Law 906/04)